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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">lexrussica</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Lex russica</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Lex Russica</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1729-5920</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2686-7869</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MSAL</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">lexrussica-25</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>НАУЧНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>SCIENTIFIC LIFE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ЭВОЛЮЦИОННОГО АРГУМЕНТА В НОРМАТИВНОЙ ЭТИКЕ: PRO ET CONTRA СПОР О НОРМАТИВНОМ ЗНАЧЕНИИ ВЫВОДОВ ЭВОЛЮЦИОННОЙ ТЕОРИИ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title></trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Прокофьев</surname><given-names>А. 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