The introduction into legislation of a provision allowing for the deprivation of a digital currency holder’s right to judicial protection has given rise to numerous theoretical and practical issues. The legislator’s definition of this phenomenon as a restriction of law does not align with the legal nature of the restrictions. An analysis of doctrinal approaches to understanding the restriction of subjective civil rights, which made it possible to identify the characteristics of restrictions, has shown that the goal of state control over tax payment cannot be regarded as a basis for imposing a restriction. Comparing the sanction in question with the denial of legal protection reveals a distinction between the two. A similar conclusion is drawn when comparing it with natural obligations. It is argued that the introduced prohibition upsets the balance of interests among civil law subjects, recognizing, under equal conditions, different legal possibilities for judicial protection of subjective rights. The introduction of this construction violates the principles of civil law. The analyzed norm regulates relationships falling within the subject matter of civil law, arising between parties in pursuit of their private interests. Consequently, embedding a public interest into their private-law relationships appears inconsistent. Given that this definition deprives a party to civil legal relations of the right to judicial protection, permits an imbalance between public and private interests, as well as between the private interests of digital currency holders belonging to different groups of parties, granting them different legal possibilities, the conclusion is drawn that this rule should be excluded from current legislation.