The Early Warning Mechanism as a Tool for Monitoring Compliance with the Principle of Subsidiarity in the European Union Legislative Procedure

The paper substantiates the definition of the concept of an “early warning mechanism”, proposes narrow and broad approaches to its interpretation, analyzes the inherent legal, political and administrative parameters. The paper demonstrates the correlation between the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and competence within the framework of the early warning mechanism, their inseparable interrelationship and consequent practical problematics. The author investigates the main forms and methods of regulating the procedure for implementation of the early warning mechanism in EU member states. It is stated that the main differences can be traced in the context of the fixed circle of subjects of the right to conduct verification, as well as the degree of detailed elaboration (specification) of the field of regulated legal relations. Based on an analysis of the content of some reasoned opinions of national parliaments, it is concluded that the lack of a common understanding of the principle of subsidiarity at the European and national levels, as well as the criteria for its compliance, have a direct impact on the early warning mechanism, which is reflected in the reduced effectiveness of its implementation. Attention is paid to the legal nature and specifics of the “yellow card” and “orange card” regimes as a variety of forms of implementation of the early warning mechanism. It is concluded that at the current stage the “card” regimes represent an insufficient and ineffective instrument for the national parliaments to influence the EU legislative process. The author highlights the problems of organizing inter-parliamentary cooperation within the framework of the early warning mechanism. It is emphasized that, in fact, national parliaments act blindly when conducting checks on the conformity of draft legislation with the principle of subsidiarity. The paper concludes that the early warning mechanism in actual modification cannot be fully qualified as a tool for providing additional legitimation of solutions made by supranational authorities. The author makes proposals for improving the institutional configuration of the early warning mechanism.

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