Remuneration for Active Refusal to Commit a Crime as an Effective Method of Combating Bribery

The paper examines effectiveness of legal mechanisms employed for combating corruption. The author analyzes economic benefits for the «bribe-taker» and «bribe-giver» when they are choosing different behaviors in typical situations classified according to the reason of the initiating party, the stage of implementation of a corrupt transaction, etc. The author concludes that an economic benefit for the parties in concluding a corrupt transaction, as well as in maintaining its confidentiality, causes latency of bribery. This circumstance results in introducing legal mechanisms into legislation and law enforcement practice that allow individuals and legal entities to economically encourage individuals and legal entities to refuse an offer from officials to pay a bribe, notify law enforcement agencies about the incident and participate in procedural actions aimed at detecting criminals. Remuneration may be provided in monetary form, while the amount should be significantly higher than the expected benefit from the suppressed corruption transaction, and/or in the form of providing a public service (even if there are no legal grounds for receiving it), and/or in the form of a refusal by a public authority to demand the performance of a civil duty. The author compares the mechanism indicated in the title of the paper with the voluntary refusal to commit a crime, determines its place in the system of incentive norms, compares it with other types of remuneration for assistance in uncovering a corruption crime, and analyzes foreign experience. The author proposes to supplement a number of legislative acts with provisions regulating remuneration for the expressed refusal to commit a crime.

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